As suggested by Arndt and Oman (2006) , Governance indicators have recently blossomed to the extent that it is no longer hyperbolizing to qualify governance assessment field as a "jungle". The question of the choice of relevant indicators thereby arouses for researchers studying institutions. While governance indicators guides have already been produced [Arndt, C., Oman, C., (2006); UNDP,(2006)], we were not able to get hold of a comprehensive and actionable methodology to compare rigorously the different institutional measures currently available. In this paper, aiming to assess the robustness of AFD 's Institutional Profiles Database -developed in partnership with CEPII and the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance -we propose different tools from simple graphic representation to advance econometrics methods to question any governance indicator relatively to its counterparts, population's experience and as far as possible objective data. We show that IPD's evaluations, for instance, regarding the extent of corruption, appears much consistent with Transparency International's CPI and World Bank's WGI. However, we also highlight this database specificity, and report a few outliers. This singularity might result from differentiated perceptions, potentially illustrating a "French bias" that, conversely, might as well reflect an "Anglo-Saxon bias", nested in World Bank's and TI's famous indicators.
I. Introduction
As suggested by Arndt and Oman (2006) , Governance indicators have recently blossomed to the extent that it is no longer hyperbolizing to qualify governance assessment field as a "jungle".
The question of the choice of relevant indicators thereby arouses for researchers studying institutions. Although governance indicator's guides have already been produced [Arndt, C., Oman, C., (2006) ; UNDP,(2007a,b)], we were not able to get hold of a comprehensive and actionable methodology to compare rigorously the different institutional measures currently available. In this paper, we will provide actionable examples for comparing governance indicators provided by different sources. Governance databases such as the World Bank's (WB) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) gather many indicators illustrating the fact that the governance field remains tremendously wide.
We decided to showcase corruption evaluations as this field attracted many research studies and measurement attempts. Hence, we will compare corruption data gathered from three different sources depicting expert's evaluations of the corruption amount across countries and time. Our three corruption assessment providers will be Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index -CPI), the World Bank (WGI: Control of Corruption) and the French Development Agency's Institutional Profiles Database (Corruption control).
The first question our reader may ask would be the following: why comparing governance assessments? First of all, we need to stress that most of the governance indicators are based on perceptions (expert's or population's). Furthermore, these measures are mainly constructed by Think tanks, National or International Institutions, following their own objectives, embodying their own ideology. Thus, comparing governance indicators and investigating their differences and similarities make sense for who wants to use them.
In this paper, we will try to provide a methodology for comparing governance indicators on different levels, using differentiated techniques, from simple graphic representation to more elaborated econometrics. We suggest that three levels of analysis may be performed: -Internal comparison: comparing the different databases between each other's; -External comparison: comparing indicators' efficiency to evaluate a common phenomenon; -Testing their sensibility to already identified biases.
Nevertheless, before analyzing measurement outcomes, a pragmatic and necessary approach should consist in scrutinizing the way the data are collected and aggregated.
As previously mentioned, we will compare corruption data provided by three distinct sources. Nevertheless, observing the sub components of WB's Control of Corruption and Transparency International's CPI, we assume that these two indicators might provide very close evaluations as they share common sources. However, WB's corruption indicator aggregates more sub components from more various sources (household surveys and expert's evaluations). We gather in appendix 6, table e and f, these indicators' sources.
Ultimately, only AFD's database fundamentally differs from the previous, as the Institutional Profiles Database gathers first hand evaluations, collected by AFD. Furthermore, AFD's data embodies an original feature as these evaluations only result from French expert's evaluations.
Since 2006, World Bank's WGI incorporate AFD's evaluations. Thus, we assume that the most divergent assessments would arise from AFD and Transparency International -which are completely independent.
This brief analysis already provides insights regarding possible convergence and divergence between our data providers. In the following sections, we propose quantifying these differences and investigate their determinants, trying to unveil measurement flaws or bias.
In this perspective, we dedicate our first section to a descriptive analysis, providing a dashboard of graphic representations. The second and third sections then propose econometrics investigation aiming to uncover measurement hazards. 
II. Graphic representations, towards a dashboard
In this section, we will present simple ways to compare data from different sources using graphic representations. Indeed, this kind of representations allows describing easily salient features extracted from a huge amount of information while permitting sharing stylized facts to a non-specialist audience. However, the choice of the methodology is crucial to properly present the most relevant information. We will therefore present a few different alternatives and warn about possible pitfalls.
A. Data clustered
Clustering data allows representing variables and provides a first interpretative framework. If micro-data enables grouping information according to respondents' characteristics (e.g. income, gender, urban/rural, etc. -in a nutshell, microeconomics variables), macro cross-sectional datasets like the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) "only" enables sorting variables within other macro data. In the following examples, we decided to cluster our data relatively to the Human Development Index (HDI). Alternatively, we could have chosen GDP quartiles, population's size, etc. Nevertheless, as IPD attempts to question development process, we thought appropriate clustering by Human development (HD). As gathering data reduces the amount of information, many ways to represent clustered variables exist.
Indicators pathways
"Indicators pathways" consist in drawing lines describing countries' characteristics -for instance, groups of countries -relatively to the different data sources one aims to compare. Figure 3 represents the average evaluations of corruption from 3 different sources. According to the way we normalized the data, 100 stands for a corruption-free country. 
Interpretation
This first representation already provides interesting information for comparing these 3 sources. One can notice that for medium and low level of Human development, IPD seems to flag lower corruption scores (more corruption). Reversely, for countries with high levels of HD, IPD seems to provide better scores than Transparency International and the World Bank. Finally, it seems that corruption evaluation almost reaches a consensus for the upper HD quartile. Overall, it seems that, aggregated by quartile, our 3 sources draw a pretty similar picture of the corruption scourge. Figure 4 , provides an alternative way to present the very same data.
Conclusion
The use of arithmetic mean of clustered data is a very simple way to compare different source. Nevertheless, we will show in the next section that this first method is not only simple but simplistic and may provide a biased picture of the reality. Indeed, arithmetic means comparison tells us nothing about the distribution within each source.
B. Comparisons using Gap estimators
We previously represented clustered data without proceeding to further calculations. Nevertheless, it is convenient -and desirable -to measure the gap existing between each source, for each country, computing a spread indicator.
Usually, aiming to compare variability within a distribution, we use the standard deviation which informs the dispersion from the average. Comparing databases, it is indeed possible to measure the standard deviation across the different sources. Nevertheless, using standard deviation across sources to compare their dispersion, will inform about the variability of the sources as a whole and will not help quantifying the dispersion from an indicator to another, nor providing clues about the direction of the spread. Therefore, we suggest elaborating gap vectors to isolate differences, one to one. Gap indicators may be constructed using relative (%) or simple differences, both using whether or not absolute values -see Appendix 1 for computation methodologies. Once computed for each country and source, we obtain vectors filling the gap between the different sources. Thereby, it is now possible to present our 3 sources the following way: Figure 5 , provides a snapshot of the measurement spreads between our 3 corruption sources, not using raw data but the spread vectors we constructed (simple difference with IPD as a benchmark). In this chart, the 0 line stands for the referee we chose: the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD). Light-blue bars refer to Transparency's CPI, whereas the dark-blue ones represent World Bank's CC -all clustered by HD. Both light and dark-blue bars thereby represent the average gaps between the Corruption Perception Index (CPI, Transparency International) and Corruption Control (CC, World Bank), relatively to AFD's evaluations (variable A302, IPD), sorted by Human development quartiles.
This kind of drawing helps readers to compare easily the different sources at stake, while providing the beginning of a description concerning the common evolution of corruption and Human development.
Focusing on the gulf separating these 3 sources, figure 5 provides a different picture from the previous ones. Observing figure 4, one would have concluded that IPD and Transparency International provide a very close picture of the corruption extent in countries flagging very high levels of Human development. Nevertheless, Figure 5 tends to nuance this assertion. Indeed, the means of the gaps are not equal to the gap separating the mean of each source. Table 1 shows that the gap separating the means of source 1 & 2 is null, whereas, the mean of the gaps across source 1 & 2 is 2.67. Arithmetic mean, contrarily to geometric and harmonic ones, does not take distribution into account, and therefore, can provide the same average for data differently distributed. Thus, it is possible to observe the same average for totally different distributions, whereas the mean of the gaps is sensitive to standard deviations across (horizontally) the two series. The use of geometric mean in place of arithmetic one is then a better choice for comparing groups from different sources, if one wants to use the simplest methodology ( figure 3 & 4) . Figure 6 proposes an alternative layout: Figure 6 . Clustered gaps using Human development quartiles -lines Figure 5 and 6 show that the gaps seem to be wider -in average -in countries displaying very high and medium level of Human development. These charts inform that, the average gaps separating the World Bank from AFD is smaller than the one separating AFD from Transparency International. This conclusion seems consistent as the World Bank uses AFD database as a source for its Worldwide Governance Indicators.
Nevertheless, one should be careful describing such representation, not to make statements about World Bank and Transparency International proximity. Indeed, not unlike figure 3 and 4, the clustered data we display still doesn't describe the structure of the data. Therefore, it only permits comparing IPD to the World Bank and IPD to Transparency International. Table 2 provides an example of 3 different distributions displaying the same means of gaps when comparing S2 and S3 relatively to S1, whereas S2 and S3 are pretty different.
In order to compare the corruption evaluations provided by the World Bank and the one constructed by Transparency International, it is necessary to introduce the gap vector discussed. Figure 7 displays the gap separating World Bank from Transparency International, using this time, a relative gap that measures the spread (here in %). This last kind of representation thus provides further information, portraying a more accurate picture of the difference of measurement across our 3 sources. Nevertheless, as we use gaps computed using directions, the average remain difficult to interpret. Therefore, we propose a last chart using gaps constructed with absolute values:
Conclusion
This new representation draws a new picture of the measurement differences across the selected corruption evaluations as it depicts slighter gaps between the CPI and World Bank's WGI. Hitherto, we displayed various ways to represent the same data and showed that they can draw very different portraits depending on the methodology used. Although grouping data allows easily summarizing information, we warned about a misinterpretation of such graphic representations.
To avoid this kind of pitfalls, we will present in the following sections further ways to represent data, displaying this time, all observations. The challenge will then lie in fostering readability, considering the tremendous volume of information. 
C. Towards more accuracy: representing every single country, fostering readability
In this section, we will try to address the challenge of readability by using 4 different types of representations. We will also introduce alternative ways of comparison. As an alternative example, Figure 9 and 10 do not use anymore the index themselves, but the resulting rankings among each consolidated sources (same sample, the same year). This methodology enables not normalizing data and takes into account that the CPI is actually more a ranking of rankings than an absolute diagnostic of the corruption scourge. Figure 9 piles up, for each country, the different ranking obtained for each source. A flat line shows that the 3 sources provide the same ranking for the considered country, whereas a hilly or steep line informs heterogeneous rankings.
Although this first attempt is obviously not the easiest to interpret, it, nevertheless, permits flagging outliers such as Iran, Sudan, Bahrain or Philippines. With figure 10, we draw a more readable picture, while adding further information. Interpretation Figure 10 also displays our entire sample for each source, using consolidated rankings. This time, we sorted our datasets according to the Institutional Profiles Database. Thus, the blue bars describe the ranking obtained with AFD, the red and green bars flag the rankings resulting from Transparency International and the World Bank. The length of the bars describes the variability of the sources whereas the capping purple bars inform the standard deviation. Although we previously mentioned standard deviation was not the more precise information, associated with complementary ways to discriminate sources (for instance the differentiated lengths of the bars), standard deviation allows flagging outliers at a glance. Thus, Sudan, Iran, Kenya, Philippines are rapidly identified as countries where corruption evaluation is far from meeting a consensus.
Limits IPD -contrarily to Transparency's CPI and most of the source of the World Bank Governance indicators-is not initially conceived for ranking exercises. The CPI for example is a ranking of rankings; as IPD covers fewer countries; an issue of ranking transitivity may arise. Nevertheless, this limit is common to every econometrics analysis using this kind of indicators with different sample size. Ultimately, this chart remains consistent and provides some clues for robustness evaluation.
Figure 11 describes an alternative way to express differences among our sources, displaying the gaps for every single country. In this new representation, the gaps are simply computed using difference -with IPD as a benchmark -and sorted by Human development.
Interpretation
Such an "altitude map"
1 enables comparing AFD's evaluations relatively to the ones of the World Bank & Transparency International but also with each other. Indeed, displaying all countries, it is no longer necessary to create sub-groups using average. Using simple difference gaps it is possible to report their direction, informing which source overestimates the phenomenon relatively its competitors while comparing them to each other.
This picture finally confirms that World Bank evaluations are pretty closed to the ones of Transparency International; it also shows that only for a few cases -Chad; Honduras; Malta; Japan, each time associated with small gaps -AFD is either above or below its two counterparts, but rarely in the midst. This last graph is likely the one providing the most relevant information to describe the differences across our 3 different sources. However, as mentioned previously, graphic representation and more generally descriptive statistics are little help to explain the observed differences or to evaluate the ability of these indicators to fulfill their duty. 
D. Combined Plot Box
Ultimately, and before introducing econometric analysis, we chose to highlight an alternative way to portray our indicators. The Box Plots displays the dispersion of observations in a plane relatively to variables (the axis). Theoretically, to represent 3 variables, 3 dimensions would be necessary. However, 3 dimensions Box Plots are difficult to interpret (see the one we built in Appendix. 2). Thus, we chose to superimpose two dispersions on a two dimensions plane. These dispersions and related adjustment curves, once again, confirm the strong linear correlation between our 3 sources. Finally, this chart seems to show that the dispersion is the widest for countries displaying a "medium" level of corruption. One may explain this matter of fact suggesting that in countries where corruption is widespread its evaluation reaches a consensus -so as in countries where corruption is anecdotic.
Conclusion
In this section, we highlighted various graphic representations with the sole purpose of comparing different sources probing the same phenomenon. We tried to present manifold alternatives and described their assets and limits. As mentioned, graphic representations are particularly useful to display easily a global picture and emphasize outliers. Nevertheless, these tools remain fundamentally descriptive. Further econometrics analyses are therefore necessary to inform better the relationship between these indicators and the facts they are supposed to describe while trying to identify potential bias. In this perspective, we dedicate the following sections to the use of econometrics techniques. 
III. Using Econometrics
In section II, we proposed various ways to draw graphic representations for comparing Governance database. We will now present econometrics tools to compare the corruption evaluations provided by the same 3 distinct data producers.
We previously attempted to demonstrate that one should be careful interpreting graphic representations. Although econometrics is also subject to interpretation, it provides powerful tools to evaluate thoroughly common points and differences among variables. We will present three types of analysis: bivariate correlations, Principal Components Analysis (PCA), and multivariate analysis. These three methods are not antagonistic but rather complementary, providing gradual levels of statistical proof associated, in return, with a gradual level of complexity.
A. Pairwise correlations
A simple and convenient way to evaluate the relationship between 2 variables is to perform pairwise correlations. Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations between 4 different variables, all designed to evaluate corruption, the same year (2009). Additionally to the 3 previous indicators, we added a new one that we constructed aggregating data provided by Gallup, on behalf of Transparency International. The Global Corruption Barometer variable is thus based on household surveys -populations' perceptions of corruptionand provides a different kind of evaluation than the ones provided by experts (IPD, CPI or World Bank's WGI 2 ). Table 3 shows that our experts' evaluations are extremely correlated (correlation coefficients from 0.905 to 0.985). The correlations matrix shows that AFD's evaluations are closer to the ones of World Bank, while Transparency International and the World Bank provide very similar appreciation of the corruption extent. One can notice that the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) although based on a different type of evaluation is also correlated with our 3 experts' measurements. Nevertheless, the GCB covers fewer countries. Not surprisingly, WB's indicator seems to be the closest to the GCB (consistent with the fact that the World Bank uses the Global Corruption Barometer as a source for its indicator).
Interpretation
If correlation coefficients provide an overall estimate concerning the level of association between variables, this tool does not allow explaining similarity determinants nor provides a strong statistical proof. Therefore, introducing controls in a multivariate analysis is necessary. Furthermore, comparing sources with each other does not tell much about their ability to actually inform the extent of corruption.
Before introducing modelisation through multivariate analysis, we will present a last method for comparing data, mixing graphic representation and econometrics.
B. Factorial map using Principal Components Analysis
The Principal Components Analysis is a tool commonly used in data analysis, aiming to extract the substance of correlations among several variables in order to reduce the amount of information to the most salient aspects of the data. This technique is often utilized, for example, to aggregate strongly correlated data, gathering several variables into a composite index to avoid the multicollinearity of explanatory variables in multivariate analysis, while keeping much of their explanatory power. Moreover, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) enables displaying correlations in a factorial map, extracting, for example, the most two prominent common characteristics of a group of variables. Figure 13 provides the factorial map extracted from our 3 corruption sources:
Interpretation
For this analysis, we used the rankings for each indicator gathering the largest common sample of countries. On a factorial map, the closer the variables the more correlated. Figure 13 thereby illustrates the strong correlations observed between World Bank and Transparency International. Nevertheless, we previously informed that AFD's evaluations were also much linked to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Thus, one should be careful interpreting factorial maps which can be compared to concrete geographic map; thus, the scale matters. Including Gallup corruption data, we observe the factorial map on a different range due to the new extracted components. Figure 13b then reminds that AFD, the World Bank and Transparency International finally draw a very similar portrait of corruption, relatively to Gallup's household surveys 3 .
We propose, in Appendix 3, alternative ways to represent factorial maps. Indeed, if one aims to compare various aspects of governance through multiple representations, a reduced factorial map may appear more convenient. The following representations illustrate such alternatives comparing, this time, AFD's evaluations of press freedom and Rule of Law with established indicators in these fields:
3 Indicator constructed with data from the Global Corruption Barometer. 
C. Using multivariate analysis
The previous analysis compared our corruption indicators with each other. Although this kind of comparison informs about similarities, it does not compare indicators according to their ability to actually assess the phenomenon they were designed for. Corruption, not unlike other blameworthy behaviors, is hard to evaluate as no objective data exists. Therefore, to compare the ability of corruption indicators to provide a reliable assessment, we constructed a theoretical model aiming to describe corruption determinants. Keeping the same explanatory variable but changing the dependent variable, we may compare our different sources.
Corruption literature already identified likely explanatory variables to describe corruption. As we specifically target comparing databases, we suggest the reader who wants to learn further about corruption predictors consulting the fruitful literature dedicated to this specific subject. Thus, we picked up already identified predictors 4 to construct the following models, setting independent variables while alternating the explained variable: 
Interpretation
As our purpose is not to explicit corruption determinants, we won't thoroughly describe the resulting coefficients. However, one can notice that our models provide a consistent picture with already established results in this field. We will explain in the next section the quadratic shape of the relationship between Press freedom and corruption perceptions. Table 4 shows that the selected independent variables are strong predictors of our 3 sources -except GDP per capita. Indeed, R² vary from 0.83 to 0.95. Whereas the R² for the CPI and the WB are extremely similar, AFD, once again, seems to provide a slightly different picture. As previously mentioned, this does not suggest that AFD provides a less robust assessment of corruption; these results only inform that WB and Transparency International produce very similar evaluations, already explained by the number of common sources involved in their indicators' aggregation. Taking into account that AFD produces data on its own -without resorting to external sources -the proximity of its diagnostic with these famous alternatives is noteworthy.
As benchmark, we introduced a different kind of corruption estimate: bribe reporting 5 , provided by the Gallup World Poll. In order to preserve coherence, the data we use results from surveys conducted in 2009. We now propose to estimate the following model: Our results are also displayed in table 4, and provide a consistent picture with our previous analysis (lower R²: 0.498). Indeed, as we showed previously, introducing a different kind of measurement as a benchmark, one can observe how related are our 3 main sources (AFD, World Bank and Transparency International).
D. Testing French and Anglo-Saxon bias, Confidence and media bias

Testing a French, Anglo-Saxon bias and libertarian economics
One of our working hypotheses is that AFD's Institutional Profiles Database might embody a "French bias". Indeed, French used to defend a more social approach of economic and political choices supporting more constrained markets. Furthermore, France has long maintained particular links towards its former colonies. These two features may lead French experts to embody a different picture of what "good governance" should be, and thereby provide a different evaluation from Anglo-Saxon experts. One might, for example, assume that French experts would -consciously or not-be more indulgent towards France's former colonies.
We decided to investigate these assumptions trying to identify differences in corruption evaluations within France's former colonies and less deregulated economies. In this perspective, we gathered data provided by La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1998) distinguishing the legal origin of countries (French or Anglo-Saxon).
We also introduced what we consider as the most neoliberal-oriented governance indicator: the Index of Economic Freedom, constructed by the Heritage Foundation 6 . Using this index we target observing AngloSaxon experts being more indulgent assessing "Free economies" -relatively to French experts. Table 5 gathers the estimates results for the previous models to which we added the beforehand described variable: can be approached by…
Adding a variable -a potential bias, for instance -in the predictors, we will observe the dependent variable sensitivity, the coefficients and sign of the additional variables.
a. Testing a "French bias"
As mentioned, we introduced a variable marking the French legal origin of countries. This variable is coded this way: country i has a French legal origin=1, 0 if not [See, La Porta & al. (1998) ]. Table 5 shows that only AFD's IPD reacts to countries' French legal origin. Furthermore, the coefficient is important and statistically significant. A positive coefficient implies that a French legal origin higher the score for the corruption indicator (100 standing for a corruption-free country; 0 for widespread corruption 8 ) Thus, AFD's Institutional Profiles Database seems to provide French legal origin countries with a better score. If this variable had the same behavior within models explaining World Bank's and Transparency International's evaluations, we could not consider the positive coefficient as a bias. Indeed, it might have meant that in countries with a French Legal Origin, corruption appears lower -for whatever structural reasons. However, introduced in models with the CPI and the WGI as a dependent variable, the French legal origin variable did not significantly react -even though World Bank uses AFD's IPD as a source.
Nevertheless, what one may consider as a French bias might, reversely, be understood as an Anglo-Saxon flaw. Therefore, we decided to investigate further, replacing the French legal origin variable by the one flagging an Anglo-Saxon legal origin.
b. Questioning an "Anglo-Saxon bias"
Contrarily to French Legal Origin, it seems that Anglo-Saxon legal origin does not affect our 3 corruption indicators. Indeed, the considered coefficients do not appear statistically significant.
c. The case of "Deregulation sympathy"
The two previous variables targeted indulgence towards former colonies. Introducing a "Deregulation sympathy" variable, we aim testing the second French feature: a preference for market regulation and social protection. Conversely, in our reasoning, Anglo-Saxon experts are supposed to embody a "Deregulation sympathy". Observing the coefficients of the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), we should be able to uncover this preference for deregulation. Table 5 confirms that this new variable significantly reacts, in an intuitive way, for both World Bank and Transparency International evaluations. Indeed, the related coefficients are significant, positive and strong, meaning that countries scoring better at the IEF are also granted with a better score for corruption evaluation. These findings seem, moreover, supported by the lack of significance of the IEF in AFD's IPD determinants model.
Comparing sensitivity to already identified bias: Confidence and Press freedom
In previous studies, we uncovered two biases affecting corruption perceptions [see Roca, T. (2010a,b) ]. First, we uncovered a quadratic relationship linking freedom of the press and perceptions suggesting that populations' and experts' 9 perceptions underestimate corruption in autocracies while penalizing young democracies. Indeed, whereas corruption extent should be adversely correlated with media freedom, we observe a quadratic adjustment curve (U shape) showing that with democracy deepening, corruption perceptions increase as media start reporting it, to finally decrease with the reduction of the "real" corruption amount. To take into account this quadratic relation, we need to include both press freedom and its square in our predictors. The significance of both coefficients confirms the existence of such a quadratic relationship, betraying the presence of what we called a reflective bias.
To compare our databases, we propose to evaluate their sensitivity towards this media bias, probing the significance of the quadratic adjustment. Observing table 5, we notice that both Transparency International's CPI and AFD's IPD are equally sensitive to the media bias. Only World Bank's evaluations display a lack of significance for the press freedom variable. Thus, we suggest that World Bank's corruption diagnostic is less affected by the media bias.
Our previous research regarding perception mechanisms also underlined the role of populations' confidence in institutions [see Roca, T. (2011) ]. We already informed the underlying potential endogeneity issue and suggested that confidence might affect surveyed population's answers in a larger extent than corruption experiences would affect populations' confidence in institutions. Introducing confidence, we assumed that experts could be influenced by populations' judgments (confidence) regarding their counties institutions. Although populations' confidence in administration is a significant predictor of populations' perceptions of corruption, table 5 shows that experts' evaluations seem not to suffer from such a bias.
Conclusion
Testing "French bias" and "deregulation sympathy", we come up with interesting results and, as far as we know, not yet unveiled by corruption literature. These results would be worth investigating further in a dedicated working paper, using other governance variables. Hence, we showed that AFD's Institutional Profiles Database is likely more indulgent towards France's former colonies. We also suggested that Anglo-Saxon evaluations were, on the other hand, likely more indulgent towards less regulated economies.
In the next and last section, we propose an attempt to confirm these results using a more sophisticated method that takes into account not only space but also time dimension: panel data econometrics.
IV. Introducing Panel data
Aiming to provide a stronger statistical analysis, we built a panel dataset. Nevertheless, the Institutional Profiles Database is not -yet-designed for time comparisons. Indeed, three surveys were conducted in 2001, 2006 and 2009 , covering a growing number of countries (from 51 to 123). Furthermore, IPD's authors have made the choice to improve the database methodology against time comparability. Therefore, waiting for a consolidated dataset, our results remain fragile.
As mentioned, we gathered data from 2001; 2006 and 2009, in order to perform a panel data analysis. In section A, we describe our methodology. Section B informs corruption determinants and bias sensitivity analysis. Finally, in section C, we attempt to explain the differences between our datasets, questioning the gap indicators we constructed.
NB. Readers interested in comparing the differences introduced by the changing sample size in our previous multivariate analysis, can find the very same analysis using a pooled panel dataset in appendix 5.
As first questioning using indicators for different time periods, we decided to probe overtime pairwise correlations. We therefore constructed correlations matrices, flagging time correlations for each corruption evaluation (see appendix 4). Our results show strong auto-correlations for the World Bank and Transparency International (0.935<R²<0.981) and a slightly weaker time dependency in the case of AFD (0.882<R²0.899). These coefficients remain very strong, underlining that corruption behaviors seem quite steady over medium terms.
A. Methodology
For the time being, only 3 editions of the Institutional Profiles Database are available, with evolving geographic coverage. Therefore, we benefit from incomplete time series, likely inducing an unbalanced panel. Before testing heteroscedasticity, we will investigate the presence of random effects using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test on the IPD determinants' model.
Fix (a.) or random (b.) effect models?
As reminded by Gujarati, D.N. (2002) , the choice between the fix and random effect models is based on the assumptions they suppose, mainly regarding the correlation between cross-section specific error component Ԑ ij and the explanatory variables. Assuming a lack of correlation, the random effects model would provide robust estimates; otherwise the fix effect model should be preferred. To put it simply, if we face a panel with many time series and few individuals (countries in our case) fix effect models (FEM) should be preferred. If our panel is constructed using many heterogenic individuals (which is the case dealing with various countries around the world) we assume that the cross-sectional component is random. Thus, the random effect model provides reliable estimates. [See Gujarati (2002) , chapt. 16] With a panel covering only 3 years but 123 countries, our analysis clearly fit the random effect hypothesis.
Nevertheless, we will test the presence of random effect using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, comparing the fix (1.) and random effect (2.) models: The null hypothesis stands for Var(u) = 0, thus, a significant result rejects Var(u)= 0.
As the result appears significant we must reject the fix effect model for the random effect one. Table 7 , displays the estimation of the basic model using the random effect model:
Heteroskedasticity diagnostic
As corruption data backed on household surveys still suffers from incomplete coverage, the number of missing values in our dataset may lead to an unbalanced panel that frequently introduces heteroskedasticity. In order to diagnose it, we performed a Likelihood-ratio (LR) test for heteroskedasticity: Likelihood-ratio test: LR chi² (107) = 84586.03 Prob > chi² = 0.0000
The null hypothesis standing for homoskedasticity, the Likelihood-ratio test indicates that our panel faces heteroskedasticity. The most accurate estimation is then provided by the Generalized Least Squares (GLS). 
Conclusion
The tests we performed show that the Generalized Least Squares model would provide consistent estimators. Table 8 , displays the GLS estimations of the GPV determinants:
Interpretation
Using panel data, our models estimates are now supported by 228 observations over 3 different time periods. Table 8 shows that our predictors possess a strong explanatory power (chi2(5) = 8030.06). In the following section, we will once again compare our 3 databases questioning the stability of our earlier findings.
B. Corruption evaluations determinants, panel data
In order to compare our 3 sources in the light of panel data, we reproduced the previous analysis interchanging our explained variable but keeping steady our predictors. We will first evaluate corruption determinants then test the uncovered biases using, this time, the gap vectors we constructed.
IPD, CPI and WGI in panel data: Comparing coefficients and explanatory powers 
Interpretation
Using GLS estimates, R² are no longer a robust fit diagnostic tool. The Wald chi2 statistics is not, strictly speaking, a model fit diagnostic one can use to compare alternatives models. Indeed, it tests whether the predictors are jointly significant. One may consider the Wald chi2 as the F-test in OLS regressions. Nevertheless comparing our datasets remains possible observing each predictor. Overall, one can notice that all our explanatory variables behave the same ways -same level of significance, same signs. Once again this analysis tends to show that overall, these corruption assessments seem pretty similar.
C. Testing biases, explaining measurement gaps
GapC = relative difference between IPD and CPI; GapW= relative difference between IPD and WGI; 1. A tricky interpretation of the gap between sources In order to observe not only the size of the gap but also its direction -informing which source provides the better score-we choose to compute Gaps using the previously mentioned formula (appendix 1.B.2) with IPD as a benchmark. This methodology, while embodying more information, implies a less intuitive interpretation. Considering the way we constructed the gap vectors, we must interpret spread outcomes this way:
According to the way we normalized the corruption evaluations, a higher score implies less corruption thus: Introducing multivariate analysis to explain GapC i,j and GapW i,j we try to isolate predictors that might be able to influence the measurement gap between sources. Thus, a positive coefficient would traduce the fact the considered predictor drives AFD to increasingly underestimate corruption relatively to Transparency International (or vice versa, Transparency to increasingly overestimates corruption relatively to AFD).
Reversely, a negative coefficient would drive AFD to increasingly overestimate corruption relatively to Transparency international.
NB: the same reasoning applies to GapW.
Modeling the Gaps
Considering the preceding analysis, we suggest that French legal origin and Economic Freedom likely influence the gap between AFD's evaluations of corruption and its counterparts. Nevertheless we will investigate the weight of other predictors such as Anglo-Saxon legal origin, the share of Protestant, press freedom and Confidence in government. Thereby, we constructed the following models: Introducing variables one by one we obtain 5 combinations for each model 1 and 2. We gather estimates results in table 11: Table 11 informs that even using the gap methodology, our previous observations appear quite steady. Comparing AFD database to Transparency International then World Bank's data, the significant, positive and strong coefficients of the variable French legal origin confirm the unveiled French bias, nested in the IPD 10 . Furthermore, the Institutional Profile Database seems to stubbornly provide a better score than its competitors for countries displaying a high level of press freedom. The role of confidence in Government, and Anglo-Saxon legal origin provide weaker results, for displaying less significant coefficient, not reacting in every model combination.
Interpretation
Moreover, we can notice that the sympathy for deregulation (Economic freedom variable) appears not consistent in discriminating AFD from the World Bank, although it clearly influences the gap between Transparency International and AFD, in the way we previously observed. Indeed, the negative coefficients for the Economic Freedom variable in model 1.d and 1.e suggest that AFD tends to overestimate corruption in countries where the economy is deregulated -or conversely, Transparency International tends to underestimate corruption in deregulated economies.
Finally, in the same line, It seems that the World Bank's measure of corruption is more favorable to Protestant countries, whereas AFD provides the opposite result.
Conclusion
In this final section, we implemented an alternative approach, using spread vectors in a panel data. The fact that our results appear quite similar, whatever the methodology in place, reinforces their reliably, demonstrating our results robustness. Nevertheless, providing a sound judgment in regard to overestimation versus underestimation corruption remains difficult.
10 Or reversely, Anglo-Saxon bias nested in IPD's competitors. 
V. Concluding remarks
With this paper, we targeted developing a methodology for comparing perception indicators. As an example, we explored three different sources of corruption measurement: the French Development Agency's IPD, the World Bank's WGI and Transparency international's CPI.
In the first section we constructed various graphic representations in order to determine the best way to present our datasets in a comparative perspective. The resulting dashboard allows readers to better understand the data while suggesting a first interpretative framework.
Not surprisingly, Transparency International and the World Bank provide very similar indicators whereas the French Development Agency seems to offer a slightly different picture of the corruption extent.
These first observations were corroborated by the multivariate analysis we conducted. Using econometrics, we were able to propose two alternative lectures of the similarities and differences that characterize, on the one hand, AFD's corruption measurement, and, on the other hand, World Bank's and TI's indicators.
We tested several variables aiming to detect a possible indulgence within corruption estimates: French and UK legal origin (identifying former European empires influence zones), Protestant share and a "deregulation sympathy" variable (Index of Economic Freedom -Heritage foundation).
Our results suggest that a "French bias" might be nested in AFD's corruption evaluations. However, symmetrically we suggest that these results might also depict an "Anglo-Saxon" flaw and a "deregulation sympathy", likely at work, explaining the observed differences.
We suggest that we present strong enough evidence to support the idea that French expert's assessments of corruption are probably biased for the French former colonies, so as Transparency International's indicators, which conversely, seems to be more favorable to deregulated economies.
Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that these 3 indicators depict a very similar portray of the corruption scourge. Introducing alternatives corruption evaluations (household surveys) this proximity indeed appears striking.
In the light of this analysis and keeping in mind the potential flaws that embody every perception measure, we advocate for the dissemination of the Institutional Profiles Database that gives researchers access to one of the most complete set of variables describing institution quality around the globe.
Comments and suggestion are much welcomed and may be addressed at: roca.thomas@gmail.com VI. Appendix 5. Multivariate analysis using pooled panel dataset 
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